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THE TWO FACES OF JANUS: THE JURISPRUDENTIAL PAST
AND NEW BEGINNING OF RULE 10b-5
John Patrick Clayton*
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and its implementing Rule 10b-5 are
the primary antifraud provisions for both private and public enforcement of the
federal securities laws. Neither the statute nor the rule expressly provides for a pri-
vate right of action, but federal courts have long recognized such an implied right,
and the Securities and Exchange Commission has supported the implied private
right of action as a “necessary supplement” to its own efforts. However, after a
decade of applying an expansive interpretation to Section 10(b), in the early 1970s
the U.S. Supreme Court began to narrowly interpret this implied private right of
action, citing concerns about the costs that frivolous litigation may impose on capi-
tal markets. Most recently, in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative
Traders, the Supreme Court constricted the ambit of Rule 10b-5(b)—which im-
poses liability for fraudulent misstatements—by narrowly interpreting the word
“make” in a way that effectively removes entire categories of plaintiffs from liability
under Rule 10b-5(b). While Janus involved private plaintiffs, the Court’s interpre-
tation cannot easily be distinguished on the basis of the plaintiff’s identity.
Therefore, Janus appears to limit the Commission to the same extent that it does
private plaintiffs, even if such a limitation was not the Court’s intent.
This Note offers a solution to the Commission’s Janus problem, whereby the Com-
mission could use its rulemaking authority to implement a “New Rule 10b-5.” This
New Rule 10b-5 would be drafted so that only the Commission could use it to
prosecute fraud, addressing the Court’s concern about the potential costs of ex-
panding private litigation. Additionally, the New Rule 10b-5 could substitute
different language for the word “make” so that the Commission could sidestep the
Court’s restrictive interpretation of that word’s meaning. Going forward, this bifur-
cated approach to Section 10(b)—with separate rules for private and public
enforcement—would allow the courts to interpret the contours of each cause of ac-
tion without inadvertently restricting or expanding the scope of the other.
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Exchange Commission, all of whom provided helpful comments and suggestions during the
writing of this Note. The views expressed in this Note are those of the author and are not
necessarily shared by any others, including Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP or the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
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INTRODUCTION
In ancient Roman mythology, Janus was the god of both begin-
nings and transitions.1 Because he simultaneously looked to the
past and to the future, Janus was usually depicted as having two
faces.2 The name Janus is significant in the world of securities law
because of the pivotal Supreme Court case Janus Capital Group, Inc.
v. First Derivative Traders.3 In Janus, the Court attempted to create a
bright-line rule for deciding who “makes” a material misstatement
for the purposes of securities fraud liability under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. Specifically, in Janus—a private lawsuit—the Court
limited the category of defendants subject to Rule 10b-5(b) by hold-
ing that only those with “ultimate authority” over the content of a
materially misleading statement can be liable as the “maker” of the
statement.4 This strict approach contrasts with the more broadly
construed “creation” standard, which would have allowed misstate-
ment liability to attach to an individual as long as a plaintiff
established that the individual “create[d]” the misstatement.5  Con-
sidering the Supreme Court’s Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
jurisprudence,6 it was no surprise that the Court opted for the more
stringent interpretation in this private action.
However, the Court’s reasoning is potentially problematic for the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“the Commission”). The
Court based its entire decision on a restrictive interpretation of the
word “make” that, because it is contained in Rule 10b-5(b), is used
by both private plaintiffs and the Commission alike when bringing
actions pursuant to Section 10(b). While the Court’s concern for
confining the reach of the implied private right of action clearly
underlay its interpretive approach,7 there is no way to meaningfully
distinguish the holding’s application on the basis of the plaintiff’s
identity.8 Therefore, Janus appears to restrict the Commission when
1. See EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 51 (Back Bay Books 1998) (1942).
2. See id.
3. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
4. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (“For purposes of Rule 10b-5, the maker of a statement is
the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and
whether and how to communicate it.”).
5. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8,
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-525),
2010 WL 4339892, at *8 (“The Commission has construed the term ‘make’ as providing for
primary liability when a person ‘creates’ a misrepresentation either by writing or speaking it,
providing false or misleading information for another to put into it, or allowing it to be
attributed to him.”).
6. See discussion infra Part I.
7. See discussion infra Parts I, II.
8. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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it brings actions pursuant to Rule 10b-5(b) to the same extent that
it restricts private plaintiffs.9 Accordingly, the Commission—like a
private plaintiff—must demonstrate that the “maker” of a material
misstatement is a person with “ultimate authority” over the state-
ment at issue, even if the Supreme Court did not intend this
outcome.10
Like its mythological namesake, Janus looks both to the past and
future. The decision embodies the past jurisprudential confusion
surrounding Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act11 and its
implementing regulation, Rule 10b-5, a single statute which pro-
vides for both private and public enforcement of securities fraud.12
At the same time, Janus may provide the catalyst for a future transi-
tion from the burdens on public enforcement imposed by the
decision to a “New” Rule 10b-5 for the Commission that avoids
those limitations.
One must simultaneously look to the past and consider the fu-
ture to properly understand Janus. Looking to the past, Part I will
analyze securities law cases decided prior to Janus and argue that
what underlies the Court’s interpretations of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 is its desire to curtail the expansion of an implied pri-
vate right of action and reduce the perceived costs of frivolous
private litigation. As explained in Part II, which analyzes the Janus
decision itself, such considerations clearly motivated the interpreta-
tion of Rule 10b-5 in that case. As a policy matter, these
considerations should not apply to public enforcement cases
brought by the Commission.
9. See discussion infra Part III.B.
10. See discussion infra Part III.B.
11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). Section 10(b)
makes it:
[U]nlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
Id.
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). Rule 10b-5 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . . (a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) [t]o
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
Id.
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The holding in Janus, however, cannot be convincingly distin-
guished on the basis of who is bringing the action. Looking
forward, Part III will thus explore the extent to which this inability
to distinguish frustrates the Commission’s public enforcement ef-
forts by examining various legal theories, statutes, and rules that the
Commission is either attempting to use or could possibly use to
overcome the limitations imposed by Janus. Part III will also de-
scribe the potential drawbacks of each approach.
Finally, Part IV will propose a new rule that the Commission
could issue that would adopt the “creation” standard exclusively for
public enforcement actions. Such a rule would be consistent with
the holding and policy considerations in Janus. Most importantly, it
would create a framework that bolsters public enforcement while
maintaining Janus’s reduction in unwarranted private litigation. In
this way, the proposed rule could contribute to the creation of
more efficient capital markets, thereby fulfilling the Commission’s
Section 10(b) mandate to “prescribe as necessary or appropriate”
rules and regulations that are “in the public interest.”13
I. LOOKING TO THE PAST: CASES BEFORE JANUS
In Janus, the Supreme Court applied a restrictive interpretation
of Rule 10b-5(b), which effectively narrowed the actors that could
be held liable for securities fraud.14 By exploring the Court’s evolv-
ing interpretation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Part I will place
the Janus decision in its proper context. This Note argues that Janus
was the next step in a progression of Supreme Court cases reacting
to an antifraud jurisprudence the Court perceived as unduly expan-
sive. More importantly, however, this history will show that these
concerns were entirely founded on abuses of private litigation
through the implied private right of action, rather than on the
Commission’s public enforcement actions. Acknowledging the
Court’s rationale is important in evaluating the various approaches
the Commission may take to bypass Janus, whether the Commission
brings actions under alternative statutes and regulations15 or issues
an entirely new rule.16
13. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
14. See discussion infra Part II.B.
15. See discussion infra Part III.C.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.
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A. Two Distinct Periods: Before and After Blue Chip
Supreme Court decisions prior to Janus reveal two distinct peri-
ods of securities fraud jurisprudence: the period of time before Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores17 and the period of time afterward.
Before Blue Chip, the Court focused on the federal securities laws’
remedial purpose of investor protection,18 which afforded a flexi-
ble, expansive approach to the securities laws.19 Although the
number of Supreme Court cases arising under Section 10(b) be-
tween 1946 and 1972 were few in number,20 the Court’s
nonrestrictive approach furthered the agenda of both the Commis-
sion and private plaintiffs in securities fraud actions by broadly
interpreting words and phrases like “security,”21 “purchase,”22 “in
17. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
18. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963), a case inter-
preting the antifraud provision of the Investment Advisors Act, the Supreme Court said that
securities laws passed for the remedial purpose of combatting fraud should not be “con-
strued . . . technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.” The
Court’s emphasis on the remedial purpose and the need for interpretive flexibility became
the judicial leitmotiv in subsequent cases that expanded the scope of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. See infra notes 19–26 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971) (“Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively.”).
20. 1946 was the year that Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.
1946), was decided, which was the first time a federal court recognized the implied private
right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 1972 was the year that the last pre-Blue
Chip securities law case, Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), was
decided. During this period of time, the Supreme Court decided only four cases that directly
interpreted Section 10(b), including Affiliated Ute. The other three were Superintendent of In-
surance of New York v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), SEC v. National Securities,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), and Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
21. In Tcherepnin, the Court noted that the Exchange Act “clearly falls into the category
of remedial legislation,” and that protecting investors by requiring full disclosure is “[o]ne of
its central purposes.” 389 U.S. at 336. Accordingly, the Court explained that Congress did not
adopt a “narrow or restrictive concept” of security, id. at 338, and that the term security
“embodies a flexible rather than a static principle.” Id. (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 299 (1946)). Thus, the Court held that the financial instruments at issue in the case
(withdrawable capital shares) were investment contracts, a category of securities that allowed
the investors to bring their action under Rule 10b-5. See id. at 339.
22. In SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), the Court held that the word
“purchase” encompassed the exchange by shareholders of their old stock for stock in a new
company, explaining that the “broad antifraud purposes of the [Securities Exchange Act]
and [Rule 10b-5] would clearly be furthered by their application to this type of situation.” Id.
at 467.
858 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:3
connection with,”23 and “any.”24 While the Supreme Court never
explicitly addressed the question of whether an implied private
right of action actually existed, it appeared to assume as much.25 In
addition to strengthening the plaintiffs’ bar, this assumption argua-
bly reinforced public enforcement by supplementing the
Commission’s own efforts to expose wrongdoing and increase de-
terrence. Consistent with this expansive approach, courts also
recognized “aiding and abetting” liability,26 which allowed the Com-
mission and private litigants to sue those who substantially assisted
primary violators.
Then, in 1975, the Court’s decision in Blue Chip set a new course
for interpreting Section 10(b).27 By acknowledging the costs associ-
ated with the uncertainty and abuse of securities litigation,28 the
Court introduced a new theme that would underlie its securities
fraud jurisprudence for the next thirty years.
In Blue Chip, the Supreme Court first questioned the legitimacy
of Rule 10b-5’s implied private right of action.29 Referring to what
23. See Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12. In Bankers Life, the Court once again enunciated its
then-familiar refrain: “Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively.”
Id. According to the Court, this meant that Section 10(b) barred “deceptive devices and
contrivances in the purchase or sale of securities whether conducted in the organized mar-
kets or face to face.” Id. Here, the defendant misappropriated the proceeds from a private
sale of securities, and the Court held that the deception was “in connection with” the sale of
securities. Id. (“Since there was a ‘sale’ of a security and since fraud was used ‘in connection
with’ it, there is redress under [Section] 10(b) . . . .”). Essentially, the court expanded the “in
connection with” requirement, making it easier for plaintiffs to recover under Section 10(b).
24. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 151 (“These proscriptions, by statute and rule, are broad
and, by repeated use of the word ‘any,’ are obviously meant to be inclusive.”). In Affiliated Ute,
the Court reiterated the necessity of interpreting securities legislation “flexibly” when the
purpose of the legislation is to thwart securities fraud. Id. One of the issues in Affiliated Ute
was whether the plaintiffs must demonstrate reliance on material misstatements or omissions
in order to succeed in an action that alleged a violation of Rule 10b-5. Id. at 152. Although
the Court of Appeals had held that demonstrating reliance was necessary, the Supreme Court
noted that it “[did] not read Rule 10b-5 so restrictively.” Id. Accordingly, the Court held that
in a case “involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequi-
site to recovery.” Id. at 153.
25. Although the Court did not address the implied private right of action directly, both
Tcherepnin and Affiliated Ute were actions brought by private plaintiffs pursuant to Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s implied private right of action. See supra notes 21 & 24.
26. See, e.g., 4 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 12.25[1] (6th ed. 2009) (“For years, the district and circuit courts assumed, without really
ever questioning, that private plaintiffs could bring securities fraud actions against aiders and
abettors. This was the generally accepted law notwithstanding the absence of an express right
of action.”).
27. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
28. Id. at 739–48 (discussing the various costs associated with vexatious law suits).
29. Id. at 737. Milton Freeman, one of the drafters of Rule 10b-5, frequently insisted that
the Commission staff never contemplated a private right of action when they wrote the Rule.
Milton V. Freeman, Foreward, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S1, S2 (1993) (“Obviously neither I, nor
the Commission that promulgated the Rule, had any such idea [that the Rule would provide
SPRING 2014] A New Beginning for Rule 10b-5 859
the Court considered a scant legislative history, Justice Rehnquist
described the implied action as “a judicial oak which has grown
from little more than a legislative acorn.”30 Rather than eliminating
the implied private right of action altogether, however, the Court
would prospectively impose a narrower, more restrictive interpreta-
tion.31 Whereas the Court’s earlier decisions endorsed a flexible
approach that was guided by the remedial purpose of investor pro-
tection,32 after Blue Chip the Court would invoke a rigid textualism
to exclude entire categories of defendants and potential plaintiffs
from the ambit of Rule 10b-5 in cases involving private litigants.33
In its post-Blue Chip decisions, the Court has gradually chipped
away at the expansive interpretation of Section 10(b) established by
earlier decisions, justifying its narrow approach by strictly constru-
ing the language of the statute.34 In fact, a year after Blue Chip, the
Court articulated an important limitation on the scope of Rule 10b-
5.35 It noted that the Rule—which the Commission issued pursuant
to its rulemaking authority—could be no broader than Section
10(b), which Congress passed.36 This is important because any Rule
issued by the Commission pursuant to Section 10(b), such as the
one proposed in Part IV, cannot exceed the bounds established by
the statutory language.37
the basis for a private law suit] when the Rule was adopted.”). However, only a few years after
Rule 10b-5 was promulgated, a federal district court judge recognized such a right. See Kar-
don v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Because it perceives
private litigation as a necessary supplement to its own efforts, the Commission has consist-
ently supported the private right of action along with other measures to expand the rights of
private litigants. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Abuses: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Arthur Levitt,
Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), available at http://www.banking.sen-
ate.gov/97_07hrg/072497/witness/levitt.htm (“The Commission has long maintained that
private actions provide valuable and necessary additional deterrence against securities fraud,
thereby supplementing the Commission’s own enforcement activities.”).
30. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 737.
31. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that private
actions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require a showing of scienter, rather than mere
negligence, as argued in the Commission’s amicus curiae brief).
32. See supra notes 18–26 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., infra Part I.B. However, not all decisions during the period following Blue
Chip were unfavorable to plaintiffs. For instance, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
245–47 (1988), the Court adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory, which created a presump-
tion of reliance in suits brought pursuant to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 when the
securities at issue are traded in a liquid market. This presumption obviously makes it easier
for plaintiffs to bring lawsuits.
34. See infra Part I.B.
35. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214.
36. Id. (“Thus, despite the broad view of the Rule advanced by the Commission in this
case, its scope cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under
§ 10(b).”).
37. See infra Part IV.
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B. Secondary Liability and the Road to Janus
Since Blue Chip, the Supreme Court has effectively eliminated en-
tire categories of defendants by limiting plaintiffs’ ability to sue
secondary actors under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. For instance,
in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,38
the Court held that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding
and abetting action against secondary actors under Section 10(b).39
The Court explained that the language of the statute “prohibits
only the making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the
commission of a manipulative act,”40 and that nothing in the text of
Section 10(b) imposed liability on those who aid and abet primary
violators.41
38. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
39. Id. at 191. The dissenting opinion pointed out that the majority’s holding similarly
affected the Commission’s ability to pursue aiders and abettors. Id. at 200 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (“The majority leaves little doubt that the Exchange Act does not even permit the SEC
to pursue aiders and abettors in civil enforcement actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”).
However, Congress made clear that the Commission could bring actions against aiders and
abettors by explicitly granting the Commission this authority when Congress passed the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(e) (2012)).
40. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 177; see also id. at 173 (“We have refused to allow 10b-5
challenges to conduct not prohibited by the text of the statute.”); id. at 175 (“Our considera-
tion of statutory duties, especially in cases interpreting § 10(b), establishes that the statutory
text controls the definition of conduct covered by § 10(b).”); id. at 177 (“It is inconsistent
with settled methodology in § 10(b) cases to extend liability beyond the scope of conduct
prohibited by the statutory text.”).
41. Id. at 177 (“[T]he text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and abet a
§ 10(b) violation.”). The Court in Central Bank also outlined the analytical steps that guide its
decisions in cases interpreting implied causes of action under Section 10(b). First, the Court
reviews the text of the statute. See id. at 178. If the text resolves the question, there is no need
to inquire further. However, when the text does not resolve the question, the Court attempts
to infer how the 1934 Congress would have resolved the question if the Rule 10b-5 private
right of action had been included in the Exchange Act. Id. To do this, the Court relies on the
express causes of action in other provisions of the Exchange Act, because Congress “likely
would have designed it in a manner similar to the other private rights of action in the securi-
ties Acts.” Id. at 178 (citation omitted). Although the Court in Central Bank found the text of
the statute sufficiently clear to establish that no liability extended to aiders and abettors, the
Court proceeded to demonstrate that, even under this second layer of analysis, there would
be no aiding and abetting liability. Id. at 179 (“From the fact that Congress did not attach
private aiding and abetting liability to any of the express causes of action in the securities
Acts, we can infer that Congress likely would not have attached aiding and abetting liability
to § 10(b) had it provided a private § 10(b) cause of action.”). This is because, according to
the Court, none of the express causes of action impose further liability on those who aid and
abet the primary violation. Id. at 180 (“Here, it would be just as anomalous to impute to
Congress an intention in effect to expand the defendant class for 10b-5 actions beyond the
bounds delineated for comparable express causes of action.”).
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While the Court noted that “[p]olicy considerations cannot over-
ride [its] interpretation of the text and structure of the Act,”42 the
Court did list many policy concerns underlying its interpretation. In
general, the Court voiced its concern that the costs associated with
secondary liability for aiders and abettors “may disserve the goals of
fair dealing and efficiency in the securities markets.”43 The need for
certainty in business transactions, according to the Court, militated
against the expansion of liability to cover aiders and abettors.44 The
Court also pointed out that the indeterminate rules for deciding
aiding and abetting liability led to settlements in suits that might
otherwise be meritless.45 This, in turn, encouraged strike suits and
other vexatious litigation to extract settlement fees.46 According to
the Court, the “ripple effect” of costs associated with this uncer-
tainty and excessive litigation is that newer and smaller companies
would be unable to retain advice from professionals who fear that
the company may not survive.47 The professional would then be the
scapegoat after whom the frustrated investors go to recover their
losses.48 Additionally, the costs incurred by professionals to hedge
against the risk of vexatious litigation may be passed on to their
client companies, and in turn passed on to innocent investors.49 As
discussed later, this same concern for abusive private litigation lies
beneath the Court’s interpretive approach in Janus.50
While Central Bank eliminated aiding and abetting liability, that
decision indicated that, when secondary actors engage in primary
violations, they may be held liable under Section 10(b).51 In Stoner-
idge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,52 the Supreme
Court again narrowed the scope of liability for secondary actors.
The issue before the Court in Stoneridge was whether the investors
in a company that was allegedly engaging in various accounting
frauds could also bring an action against the company’s suppliers
42. Id. at 188.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 188–89.





50. See discussion infra Part II.B.
51. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191 (“The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability
does not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability
under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who
employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a
purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b-5, assum-
ing all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met.”).
52. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
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who, by entering into bogus transactions with the company, helped
the company inflate its revenues and falsely capitalize certain adver-
tising expenses.53 The plaintiffs in Stoneridge argued that the “causal
link” between the suppliers’ assistance and the creation of the false
financial statements was sufficient to presume reliance.54
The Court, however, disagreed. In its decision, the Court noted
that whether liability extends to a secondary actor depends on
whether the plaintiff establishes reliance.55 Although courts pre-
sume reliance in two situations,56 the Court found that neither
presumption applied in Stoneridge.57 Additionally, the secondary ac-
tors had no actual knowledge of the deceptive acts.58 As a result, the
Court held that the plaintiff-investors could not demonstrate reli-
ance “except in an indirect chain that [the Court found] too
remote for liability.”59 While the Court noted that reliance and cau-
sation were closely related, in Stoneridge the deceptive acts were “too
remote to satisfy the requirement of reliance.”60 Anticipating its “ul-
timate authority” language in Janus, the Court wrote that “nothing
[the suppliers] did made it necessary or inevitable for [the company]
to record the transactions as it did,” and thus reliance could not be
shown.61
Although the Court grounded its decision in Stoneridge in the text
of Section 10(b), it managed once again to spend the largest por-
tion of the opinion discussing the statute’s legislative history and
the various policy considerations supporting its interpretation. As
in Central Bank, these policy considerations included concerns
about extending the coverage of Section 10(b) into the realm of
ordinary business and the effect of frivolous lawsuits brought by pri-
vate plaintiffs on the costs of raising capital.62
53. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 153–56. Specifically, the Court framed the issue as whether
“an injured investor may rely upon § 10(b) to recover from a party that neither makes a
public misstatement nor violates a duty to disclose but does participate in a scheme to violate
§ 10(b).” Id. at 156.
54. Id. at 160.
55. Id. at 157–59 (“Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s deceptive acts is an
essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of action.”).
56. Reliance is presumed first when one has a duty to disclose information but fails to do
so and, second, under the fraud-on-the-market theory. Id. Under the fraud-on-the-market
theory, when statements are made publicly and the company’s securities trade in an active
market, it is presumed that the public statement is reflected in the price of the security and is
therefore relied on. Id.
57. According to the Court, the suppliers in Stoneridge had no duty to disclose material
information, and their acts, even if deceptive, were never communicated to the public. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 161.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 163–64.
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Central Bank and Stoneridge are important for understanding Janus
because, as in Janus, the Court’s concern for preventing the expan-
sion of the implied private right of action—and its concomitant
costs—underlay its narrow approach to Rule 10b-5. Neither Central
Bank nor Stoneridge, however, affected the Commission’s ability to
prosecute securities fraud. After Central Bank, Congress passed a law
as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 that
explicitly allowed the Commission to pursue aiders and abettors.63
So, even if Central Bank’s rejection of aiding and abetting liability
initially applied to the Commission prior to 1995, it no longer does.
No action to preserve the Commission’s powers was needed in the
wake of Stoneridge because that decision was based on a failure to
demonstrate reliance, and the Commission does not have to prove
reliance in actions it brings pursuant to Section 10(b).64
II. THE JANUS DECISION
In Janus, the Court once again limited the class of persons that
can be sued for securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5. Specifically, the Court interpreted Rule 10b-5 to mean that only a
person with “ultimate authority” over a statement can be the
“maker” of the statement.65 This further limited plaintiffs’ ability to
bring actions against secondary actors, even if those actors provided
substantial assistance in the creation of the materially misleading
statement. This is problematic for the Commission because it also
relies on Rule 10b-5 when bringing actions under Section 10(b),
and the Court did not distinguish its holding on the basis of the
plaintiff’s identity.
A. The Facts of Janus
Janus involved material misstatements allegedly made by Janus
Investment Fund (“the Fund”) in its mutual fund prospectus.66 The
Fund was advised by Janus Capital Management LLC (JCM), which
was a wholly owned subsidiary of Janus Capital Group, Inc. (JCG), a
publicly traded company.67 The plaintiffs in Janus, First Derivative
63. Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
78t(e) (2012)).
64. 4 HAZEN, supra note 26, at § 12.10[1][A] (“Reliance is an element of a private suit
under Rule 10b-5, but not in enforcement actions brought by the government.”).
65. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).
66. Id. at 2299.
67. Id.
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Traders, were investors in the parent company, JCG.68 In the invest-
ment funds industry, it is common for a fund to be advised and
operated by a separate legal entity. In this case, that separate legal
entity was JCM. Additionally, JCM was JCG’s primary operating
company, and the two entities shared many of the same
executives.69
First Derivative Traders brought a claim under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 against JCG and JCM—but not the Fund—for the mate-
rial misstatements contained in the Fund’s prospectus. First
Derivate Traders based their suit on the theory that JCG and JCM,
by actually creating the statements filed by the Fund, also “made” the
alleged material misstatements.70 Importantly, the plaintiffs—who
were not investors in the Fund—could not sue the Fund itself,
which was the entity the Court found to have “ultimate authority”
over the misleading statements.
B. The Janus Opinion
The Janus decision, written by Justice Thomas, framed the issue
as whether JCM could be held liable in a private action under Rule
10b-5 for a false statement included in the Fund’s prospectuses.71
To answer the question, the Court looked first to the text—a famil-
iar interpretive procedure.72 In prior cases dealing with secondary
liability, however, the statute—rather than Rule 10b-5— had driven
the Court’s decisions.73 In Janus, however, the Court scrutinized the
text of Rule 10b-5 itself.74
As described by the Court, Rule 10b-5 makes it “unlawful for ‘any
person, directly or indirectly, . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of
68. Id. at 2300.
69. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 2009), overruled by Janus,
131 S. Ct. 2296.
70. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2300.
71. Id. at 2299 (“This case requires us to determine whether Janus Capital Management
LLC (JCM), a mutual fund investment adviser, can be held liable in a private action under
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 for false statements included in its
client mutual funds’ prospectuses.”).
72. See supra Part I.
73. For instance, in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., the
Court began its analysis of “the scope of conduct prohibited by § 10(b)” by announcing that
“the text of the statute controls [the Court’s] decision.” 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994). Similarly,
in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the Court said that the scope of
actionable conduct is “delimited” by the text of the statute: “Rule 10b-5 encompasses only
conduct already prohibited by § 10(b).” 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2007).
74. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301–03.
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a material fact’ in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties.”75 From this language, the Court held that JCM could only be
liable if it had “made” the material misstatements found in the pro-
spectus.76 The Court held that JCM had not.77
1. The Court’s Narrow  Interpretation of “Make” and the
Ultimate Authority Requirement
In its decision, the Court once again acknowledged its hesitation
to expand a private right of action created by the courts, rather
than by Congress.78  Thus, in interpreting the word “make,” the
Court resolved to “give ‘narrow dimensions . . . to a right of action
Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the statute and did
not expand when it revisited the law.’”79 Relying on definitions
found in both the Oxford and Webster’s dictionaries, Justice
Thomas explained the meaning of the word “make” as it was under-
stood in the 1930s,80 clarifying that “to make” in rule 10b-5 means
roughly the same thing as “to state.”81
More crucially, the Court held that “[f]or purposes of Rule 10b-
5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate
authority over the statement, including its content and whether and
how to communicate it.”82 According to the Court, one could not
have control without ultimate authority, and, when control was ab-
sent, “a person or entity can merely suggest what to say, not ‘make’
a statement in its own right.”83 Therefore, even if one prepares or
publishes a statement on behalf of the primary actor, only the pri-
mary actor can be the maker of the statement.84 To illustrate the
rule, the Court analogized to the relationship between a speaker
and speechwriter.85 Even though the speechwriter drafts the
speech, the speaker controls the content ultimately contained in




78. Id. at 2302 (“[C]oncerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of action cau-
tion against its expansion.”) (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165).
79. Id. (quoting Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167).
80. This is notable considering that Rule 10b-5, which contains the word “make,” was
not passed until the 1940s.
81. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (“The phrase at issue in Rule 10b-5, ‘[t]o make any . . .
statement,’ is thus the approximate equivalent of ‘to state.’”).
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the speech.86 Notably, the Court indicated that a statement attrib-
uted to a party, either explicitly or implicitly, is ordinarily “strong
evidence” that the statement was “made by—and only by—the party
to whom it is attributed.”87
2. Justification for the “Ultimate Authority” Requirement through
Central Bank and Stoneridge
After defining the word “make,” the Court then explained how
imposing an “ultimate authority” requirement was consistent with
its prior decisions. The Court stated that, in Central Bank, it had
“held that Rule 10b-5’s private right of action does not include suits
against aiders and abettors.”88 According to the Court, if “make”
were read more broadly than the meaning imposed by the “ulti-
mate authority” standard, then the category of primary violators
would expand to include aiders and abettors, which would “substan-
tially undermine Central Bank.”89
The Court stated that its interpretation in Janus was also sup-
ported by Stoneridge, which had emphasized that “nothing [the
defendants] did made it necessary or inevitable for [the company] to
record the transactions as it did.”90 Whenever an entity lacked the
ultimate authority over a statement’s content and the manner in
which that content would be communicated, then it was neither
“necessary [nor] inevitable” that the statement would be materially
misleading.91 In Stoneridge, the Court had found the conduct by sec-
ondary actors too remote to create reliance because, among other
reasons, the conduct did not necessarily and inevitably lead to
fraudulent financial statements.92
By citing Stoneridge, the Janus Court effectively folded Stoneridge’s
reliance requirement into the word “make.” Thus, one possible
reading of Janus is that (1) plaintiffs can only bring a Rule 10b-5
action when they can demonstrate reliance, (2) plaintiffs can never
demonstrate reliance when it is not necessary or inevitable that a
particular statement will be made, (3) the making of a statement is
86. Id.
87. Id. The degree to which this statement can be used by the Commission to overcome
the restrictive language of Janus is explored infra Part III.
88. Id. (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 180 (1994)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2303 (emphasis added) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 161 (2007)).
91. Id.
92. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159–61.
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never necessary or inevitable when the person that created the
statement lacks ultimate authority, and (4) therefore, there will
never be any reliance when there is no ultimate authority. Reliance,
of course, is an element that private plaintiffs—but not the Com-
mission—must prove in Rule 10b-5 actions.93 By merging its
understanding of reliance into the definition of “make,” however,
the Court has—perhaps inadvertently—allowed its concern for
demonstrating reliance in private suits to limit public enforcement
by the Commission.
The Court concluded its interpretation of the word “make” by
reiterating that the Court’s holding “accord[ed] with the narrow
scope that [it] must give the implied private right of action.”94 The
Court recognized that the existence of the private right is settled,
but insisted that it would “not expand liability beyond the person or
entity that ultimately has authority over a false statement.”95
3. The Court’s Holding
Having established its “ultimate authority” interpretation of the
word “make,” the Court held that “JCM did not ‘make’ any of the
statements in the Janus Investment Fund prospectuses.”96  Rather,
only Janus Investment Fund made the statements, because “[o]nly
Janus Investment Fund—not JCM—bears the statutory obligation
to file the prospectuses with the SEC.”97 Apparently, according to
the Court’s reasoning the sole entity with “ultimate authority” is the
entity with the “statutory obligation” to file the prospectus, which
means that such an entity is the only one that can “make” a state-
ment for the purposes of misstatement liability under Rule 10b-5.
The Court anticipated scenarios that could dim this bright-line
rule by highlighting facts that were not present in Janus. For in-
stance, the Court noted that in Janus there was “no allegation that
JCM in fact filed the prospectuses and falsely attributed them to
Janus Investment Fund.”98 The Court also stated that its application
relied on the fact that nothing “on the face of the prospectuses in-
dicate[d] that any statements therein came from JCM rather than
Janus Investment Fund, a legally independent entity with its own
93. 4 HAZEN, supra note 26, at § 12.10[1][A] (“Reliance is an element of a private suit
under Rule 10b-5, but not in enforcement actions brought by the government.”).
94. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 (emphasis added) (citing Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 167).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2304 (majority opinion).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2305.
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board of trustees.”99 The Court’s reliance on the absence of any
attribution seems to leave open the possibility of holding a secon-
dary actor liable for misstatements, even when it does not have
“ultimate authority” over the content of the statement, if the partic-
ular portion of the statement is explicitly attributed to it. In a
footnote, the Court wrote that it is not necessary to “define pre-
cisely what it means to communicate a ‘made’ statement indirectly,
because none of the statements in the prospectuses were attributed,
explicitly or implicitly, to JCM. Without attribution, there is no indi-
cation that Janus Investment Fund was quoting or otherwise
repeating a statement originally ‘made’ by JCM.”100
III. LOOKING FORWARD: THE EFFECT OF JANUS ON THE
COMMISSION’S ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES
Both private plaintiffs and the Commission use Rule 10b-5. It is
not obvious, therefore, why the Court’s justification for its defini-
tion of “make”—a policy of narrowly construing the scope of
implied private rights of action—should apply equally to Commis-
sion actions that are explicitly authorized. Although the Court did
not address the consequences of this problem, the dissent noted
that “under the majority’s rule it seems unlikely that the SEC it-
self . . . could . . . pursue primary violators who ‘make’ false
statements or . . . prosecute aiders and abettors to securities
violations.”101
A. Cases that Janus Does Not Appear to Affect
Although the Court in Janus held that the “maker” of a statement
must have “ultimate authority” over its contents, it added that “attri-
bution within a statement . . . is strong evidence that a statement
was made by . . . the party to whom it is attributed.”102 Not surpris-
ingly, much of the post-Janus case law has analyzed such scenarios,
particularly situations in which written statements are issued in the
name of a corporation or some other business entity but contain
signatures by individuals in either their official or personal capacity.
To date, courts have interpreted Janus to mean that, when individ-
ual corporate officers sign company documents that are filed with
99. Id. (footnote omitted).
100. Id. at 2305 n.11 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 2302.
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the Commission, these officers can be primarily liable for state-
ments contained within those documents.103
Courts have also held that individuals can be primarily liable for
documents other than SEC filings that they sign. For instance, in
one case the court held that the defendant was a “maker” of state-
ments contained in an email that the defendant sent to investors.104
In another, a court held a complaint sufficient to survive summary
judgment where it alleged that the defendant—the chief executive
officer of a mortgage lender and issuer of mortgage-backed securi-
ties—had signed and submitted an application for participation in
a federal securitization program which falsely represented that the
103. See, e.g., SEC v. Brown, 878 F. Supp. 2d 109, 115–16 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying defen-
dant’s motion for summary judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether, under Janus, defendant CFO was a maker of statements in SEC periodic reports that
she signed); SEC v. Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 WL 5980966, at *1–3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28,
2011) (pointing out that a CEO’s electronic signature on Form 8-K, which was accompanied
by the press releases that were alleged to contain material misstatements, indicated that the
statements were “made” by the CEO defendant); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No.
5:07–cv–02822–WHA, 2011 WL 5871020, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (finding, for pur-
poses of motion to dismiss, that, under Janus, defendant was maker of statements in proxy
statements where she signed a notice to shareholders on the first page of the proxy package;
she was not maker of statements in Forms 10-K and 10-Q that she did not sign); SEC v. Das,
No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787, at *6 (D. Neb. Sept. 20, 2011) (holding, under Janus,  that
defendant CFOs were makers of statements contained in Forms 10-K and 10-Q on which
their signatures and certifications appeared); see also SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11–00137 WHA,
2011 WL 3295139, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011) (noting concession by defendant that,
under Janus, he was maker of statements in registration statement that he signed). In addi-
tion to cases brought by the Commission, courts have held that, in cases brought by private
plaintiffs, an officer that signs a document filed with the Commission can be considered a
“maker” of the statements contained in the document. See, e.g., In re Smith Barney Transfer
Agent Litig., 884 F. Supp. 2d 152, 163–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding, under Janus, that defen-
dant officer was maker of statement in SEC filings that he signed); In re Stillwater Capital
Partners Inc. Litig., 858 F. Supp. 2d 277, 287–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (finding, under Janus, that
defendant president was maker of statements in proxy statement and SEC filings that he
signed); In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. 04 Civ. 9866(LTS)(HBP), 05 MD 1688(LTS), 2012
WL 983548, at *4 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (finding, under Janus, that defendant cor-
porate officer was maker of statements in SEC filings that he signed); City of St. Clair Shores
Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., No. 3:10–cv–1073–J–32JBT, 2012 WL
1080953, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2012) (finding, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, that
defendant corporate officers, under Janus,  could be considered makers of statement in SEC
filings that they certified under Sarbanes-Oxley); City of Roseville Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Energy
Solutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 395, 416–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding, under Janus, that de-
fendants were makers of statements in registration statements that they signed); In re Merck
& Co., Inc. Sec., Derivative, & ERISA Litig., MDL No. 1658 (SRC), Civil Action Nos. 05–1151
(SRC), 05–2367(SRC), 2011 WL 3444199, at *25 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011) (holding that, by
signing the documents in his capacity as a company executive, the defendant “made the
statements pursuant to his responsibility and authority to act as an agent of [the company],
not as in Janus, on behalf of some separate and independent entity.”).
104. Red River Res., Inc. v. Mariner Sys., Inc., No. CV 11–02589–PHX–FJM, 2012 WL
2507517, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2012).
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underlying loans would be eligible for Federal Housing Authority
insurance.105
Courts have also generally accepted the argument that individu-
als should be considered “makers” of statements that are specifically
attributed to them even if the statements are contained within a
larger statement “made,” according to Janus, by another entity. For
example, courts have held that, when larger documents—such as
company press releases, offering documents, news articles, and ad-
vertisements—contain written statements specifically attributed to
individuals, those individuals can be “makers” of those
statements.106
At least two cases have addressed the issue of whether an under-
writer can be held primarily liable for misstatements contained
within a document on which the underwriter’s name conspicuously
appears.107 Both cases suggest that the prominent display of an un-
derwriter’s name in the offering materials may be sufficient for the
plaintiff in a suit against the underwriters to withstand a motion for
summary judgment.108 Of course, even when attribution is sufficient
105. SEC v. Radius Capital Corp., No. 2:11–cv–116–FtM–29DNF, 2012 WL 695668, at
*4–5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2012); see also In re Flannery, SEC Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058,
at *35, *46 (ALJ Oct. 28, 2011) (initial decision) (finding that Janus applies to claims under
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act,  and that defendant, under Janus, had ultimate authority
over— and therefore was maker of—statements in letter that he wrote, signed, and directed
be sent to investors).
106. See SEC v. Daifotis, 874 F. Supp. 2d 870, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (denying defendant’s
motion for summary judgment and holding as a triable issue whether defendant, under Ja-
nus, was maker of statements specifically attributed to him in company advertisement); In re
Allstate Life Ins. Co. Litig., Lead Case No. CV–09–8162–PCT–GMS, No.
CV–09–8174–PCT–GMS, 2012 WL 1900560, at *4–5 (D. Ariz. May 24, 2012) (denying de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss and holding that defendants, under Janus, could be makers of
statements that were attributed to them in Official Statements for municipal offerings); City
of St. Clair Shores Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 2012 WL 1080953, at *3 (finding, for purposes of
defendant’s motion to dismiss, that defendant corporate officers, under Janus, could be con-
sidered makers of statements that were attributed to them in company press releases and
news articles); Lopes v. Viera, No. 1:06–CV–01243 JLT, 2012 WL 691665, at *6 (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 2, 2012) (finding, for purposes of a motion in limine, that defendant organizer of com-
pany, under Janus,  could be maker of financial information in offering document where
document stated the financial information had been provided to the company by him);
Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *3 (detailing concession, by defendant, that, under Janus,  he
was maker under advertisement that included his picture but did not otherwise attribute
statements to him).
107. See In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc. Inv. Litig., 846 F. Supp. 2d 828, 861 (S.D.
Ohio 2012); In re Allstate Life Ins. Co. Litig., Nos. CV–09–8162–PCT–GMS,
CV–09–8174–PCT–GMS, 2012 WL 176497, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 23, 2012).
108. See In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc. Inv. Litig., 846 F. Supp. at 861 (finding that it
was “a triable issue as to whether [the underwriter could] be held liable for the misrepresen-
tations in the [offering materials]” when the underwriter’s name was “prominently”
displayed on the front pages of the offering materials and the underwriter was “specifically
designated” to make representations about the securities); In re Allstate Life Ins. Co. Litig.,
2012 WL 176497, at *5 (holding that, when underwriters’ names were displayed in bold and
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at pre-trial stages of litigation, mere attribution may still be insuffi-
cient to satisfy the ultimate authority definition.
B. Can the Holding in Janus Be Limited to Private Suits?
One obvious way the Commission can bypass Janus is to argue
that the holding applies only to private actions. In its opinion in
that case, the Court framed the issue by stating that “[t]his case
requires us to determine whether . . . a mutual fund investment
adviser can be held liable in a private action under . . . Rule 10b-5.”109
The Court was also “mindful” of giving the word “make” a “narrow”
interpretation because of its concerns about expanding a private
right of action that was created by the courts rather than
Congress.110
Additionally, in its extratextual justification, the Court repeatedly
focused its discussion on continuing concerns about the scope of
private actions brought under Rule 10b-5. For instance, in discuss-
ing Janus’s lineage from recent precedent, the Court described
Central Bank as a case in which it “held that Rule 10b-5’s private right
of action does not include suits against aiders and abettors.”111 The
Court then noted that a “broader reading of make”—one that ex-
panded the class of plaintiffs in private actions—would
“substantially undermine Central Bank,” presumably because it
would allow private plaintiffs to bring suits in situations otherwise
barred by Central Bank.112 The Court noted that, despite its ruling in
Central Bank, the Commission can still bring suits against aiders and
abettors.113 So, when the Court discusses a holding that would un-
dermine Central Bank, it is obviously not speaking of an
interpretation that would undermine Central Bank as it pertains to
enforcement actions brought by the Commission.
Finally, the Court concluded its legal analysis by discussing Stoner-
idge—a case that only affects private plaintiffs—and reiterating the
“narrow scope that [the Court] must give the implied private right
in a prominent position on certain offering materials, the plaintiffs had adequately alleged
that the underwriters made the material misstatements).
109. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2299 (2011)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 2301 (“We granted certiorari to address whether JCM can be
held liable in a private action under Rule 10b-5 for false statements included in Janus Invest-
ment Fund’s prospectuses.” (emphasis added)).
110. Id. at 2302.
111. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 180 (1994)).
112. Id.
113. Id. (“Such [aiding and abetting] suits may be brought by the SEC.”).
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of action.”114 Clearly, it is the Court’s concern for limiting private
actions that drove its decision in Janus, not a desire to subdue pub-
lic enforcement.
An interpretation that applies Janus differently depending on the
plaintiff’s identity is also consistent with the policy concerns the
Court has enunciated in its decisions since Blue Chip. As described
in Part I, the Court’s narrow approach to Section 10(b) grew out of
a desire to quell what it considered frivolous lawsuits being brought
by private plaintiffs: because the Court doubted the legitimacy of
the private right of action, going forward it would no longer ex-
pand it.115 Janus obviously embodies this approach insofar as the
decision limits private actions. However, the Court has never enun-
ciated a similar approach to actions brought by the Commission,
which are expressly created under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Therefore, cabining Janus as a decision concerning only private ac-
tions would not conflict with the Court’s primary concern of
restricting private actions.
Although it may be clear that Janus was motivated by a concern
for private actions, the simplicity of distinguishing the Janus deci-
sion on the basis of the plaintiff’s identity belies an obvious
impediment: the Court based its entire decision on the word
“make.” Unless the Court adopts the above approach and explicitly
differentiates interpretations depending on who is bringing the ac-
tion, the language and reasoning in Janus do not readily support an
argument limiting its holding to private litigation.116 Therefore, it is
not likely that lower courts would be willing to widen the narrow
path set by the Supreme Court. Additionally, it is not clear how the
Court itself could persuasively escape the strictures of Janus without
expressly overruling it. Thus, going forward, it is likely that the
Commission will have to find other ways to circumvent Janus be-
sides arguing that the decision does not apply to public
enforcement actions brought under Rule 10b-5.
114. Id. at 2303 (citing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 167 (2007)).
115. See supra Part I.A.
116. At least one article assumes that Janus may not apply to actions brought by the Com-
mission and contends that the Commission’s interpretation of “make” is “entitled to
substantial judicial deference in future enforcement actions” because it “would withstand
Chevron-style analysis.” See Matthew P. Wynne, Note, Rule 10b-5(b) Enforcement Actions in Light of
Janus: Making the Case for Agency Deference, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2111, 2111 (2013). As ex-
plained above in Part III.B, Janus was written in a way that forecloses any interpretation
distinguishing its application on the basis of the plaintiff’s identity. Whether Janus might
apply to actions brought by the Commission is not an open question to which Chevron defer-
ence may apply. Accordingly, the Commission has not pursued this argument.
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C. Actions Brought Under Alternative Statutes and Rules
The Commission can possibly bypass the limitations imposed by
Janus by bringing actions for fraudulent statements pursuant to stat-
utory provisions other than Rule 10b-5(b). As described below, the
Commission is already doing this in some cases. Although alterna-
tive provisions may provide a convenient avenue for avoiding the
Janus roadblock, these detours are accompanied by certain disad-
vantages. This section describes these alternatives and highlights
the principal drawbacks of each.
1. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
One way the Commission has coped with Janus is by relying on
Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act.117 This provision contains
language similar to that found in Rule 10b-5(b), with a critical dif-
ference. Instead of the verb “make,” Section 17(a) makes it
unlawful to obtain money or property in the offer or sale of securi-
ties “by means of” a fraudulent statement.118 In its briefs, the
Commission has argued that this difference in language supports
the view that Janus’s “ultimate authority” definition of “make”
should not be imported to Section 17(a)(2)’s “by means of” lan-
guage.119 The Commission has cited SEC v. Tambone for the
proposition that the phrase “by means of” captures a broader range
of activity than Rule 10b-5’s “make.”120 Furthermore, the Commis-
sion has pointed out that Janus was chiefly concerned with limiting
implied private actions.121 Because such private actions are unavaila-
ble in Section 17(a),122 the Commission has argued that Janus does
not apply to Section 17(a) claims.123 So far, the handful of courts
that have confronted the issue have agreed with the Commission’s
117. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (2012).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at
19–21, SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11 Civ 07388 (JSR)) 2012 WL
2133431.
120. See, e.g., id. According to SEC v. Tambone, Section 17(a)(2) claims do not require the
seller to have made the untrue statement himself; it is enough that the seller “uses” a false
statement—”regardless of its source”—in order “to obtain money or property.” Id. at 20
(quoting SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 127 (1st Cir. 2008)).
121. See, e.g., id. at 19.
122. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568–78 (1979).
123. Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 119,
at 19 (citing Finkel v. Stratton Corp., 962 F.2d 169, 174 (2d Cir. 1992)).
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position.124 Therefore, if the early cases are any indicator, the Com-
mission may be able to bypass the “ultimate authority” definition of
“make” by bringing actions pursuant to Section 17(a)(2).
Section 17(a)(2) and Rule 10b-5(b), however, are not coexten-
sive, and Section 17(a)(2) therefore does not provide a perfect
substitute for misstatement actions brought under Section 10(b).
Section 17(a)(2) pertains only to misstatements in connection with
the “offer or sale” of securities,125 whereas Section 10(b) applies to
both misstatements made in connection with the “sale” of securities
and those made in connection with their “purchase.”126 Neverthe-
less, this difference may not be a significant limitation on the
Commission’s enforcement efforts if most cases alleging fraudulent
statements are in fact in connection with the “sale” of securities
rather than their “purchase.”127
124. For instance, in SEC v. Daifotis, the district court noted that, “[i]mportantly, the word
‘make,’ which was the very thing the Supreme Court was interpreting in Janus, is absent from
the operative language of Section 17(a).” No. C11–00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011). Instead, Section 17(a) makes it unlawful (1) “to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud,” (2) “to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement” or omission of a material fact, or (3) “to engage in” transactions that “would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.” Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q(a)(2) (2012). The court also agreed that the Supreme Court’s “stringent” interpreta-
tion of the word “‘make’ followed from [its] prior decisions limiting the scope of implied
private rights of action under Rule 10b-5.” Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *6 (emphasis ad-
ded). Accordingly, the district court held that Janus’s definition of “make” does not apply to
Section 17(a), which contains no implied private right of action. Id. Relying on analogous
reasoning, other courts have similarly declined to apply Janus to claims under Section 17(a).
See SEC v. Sells, No. C 11-4941 CW, 2012 WL 3242551, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012); SEC v.
Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., No. 6:09-cv-1963-Orl-28GJK, 2012 WL 3264512, at *3 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 9, 2012); SEC v. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 07 C 4684, 2012 WL 1079961, at
*14–15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2012); SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 377,
422 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822-WHA, 2011 WL
5871020, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011); SEC v. Geswein, No. 5:10CV1235, 2011 WL
4565861, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2011); see also SEC v. Radius Capital Corp., No. 2:11-cv-
116-FtM-29DNF, 2012 WL 695668, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2012) (granting a motion to dis-
miss a Rule 10b-5(b) claim for failure to allege specific facts showing the defendant had
“ultimate authority” over statements while denying a motion to dismiss for Section 17(a)
claims against the same defendant based on identical allegations). But see SEC v. Perry, No.
CV-11-1309 R, 2012 WL 1959566, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2012) (holding that Janus applies
to claims brought by the Commission under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act); SEC v.
Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (same); In re Flannery, SEC Release No. 438,
2011 WL 5130058, at *35 (ALJ Oct. 28, 2011) (initial decision) (same).
125. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2).
126. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
127. Insider trading cases, for example, are probably the most prevalent fraud cases that
relate to the “purchase” of securities, and they rely on a theory that is wholly different from
the “making” of a statement. See generally 4 HAZEN, supra note 26, at § 12.17[1] (explaining
that, while Rule 10b-5(b) has been used to bar insider trading, “[i]n most cases . . . accounta-
bility for trading on inside information is premised upon Rule 10b-5(c)’s ban on acts or
practices that operate as fraud”).
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When bringing an action under Rule 10b-5, the Commission
must prove scienter.128 One would expect that scienter-based viola-
tions are more likely to carry a social stigma than those based on
strict liability or negligence. Thus, the main problem with the sub-
stitution of Section 17(a)(2) may be its relative ineffectiveness at
deterring fraud. Although Section 17(a)(1), like Rule 10b-5, re-
quires proof of scienter, the Commission must only prove
negligence in actions brought pursuant to Sections 17(a)(2) and
(3).129 This does not mean that the Commission must bring actions
on the basis of negligent conduct. Given the challenges in proving
either intentionality or recklessness, however, the temptation to
bring actions under the negligence standard would be understand-
able. Janus, which makes it more difficult for the Commission to
prosecute misleading statements under Rule 10b-5, may increase
the Commission’s tendency to rely on Section 17(a)(2) instead of
risking dismissal or loss at trial. And if the Commission’s primary
tool for prosecuting misleading statements requires only proof of
negligence, there is a serious risk of diluting the social stigma asso-
ciated with violating the securities law. Also, negligence-based
violations carry smaller penalties than intentional violations.130
Thus, the cost of violating Section 17(a)(2) may decrease, which
could correspondingly weaken the Commission’s ability to deter fu-
ture violations.131
128. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (“In our view, the rationale of Hockfelder
[sic] ineluctably leads to the conclusion that scienter is an element of a violation of § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought.”).
129. See id. at 695–700.
130. See Securities Act of 1933 § 20(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(2) (setting forth increased
monetary penalties when violations involve “fraud, deceit, manipulation, or reckless disre-
gard of a regulatory requirement”).
131. Furthermore, the Commission has already received criticism for its shift to negli-
gence-based claims, which by definition allege less culpability than intent-based claims. The
spate of negligence-based claims arising out of the financial crisis led one writer to ask
whether Congress and the public might think it “better for the Commission to focus on cases
where there is clear cut fraud.” Lawrence Iason, The SEC Should Focus on Fraud, Not Negligence,
FORBES (Nov. 16, 2011, 8:06 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2011/11/16/the-
sec-should-focus-on-fraud-not-negligence/; see also Russell G. Ryan, To Err Is Human . . . and
Punishable by the SEC, CFO.COM (Nov. 1, 2011), http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/
14606438. Of course, the Commission might respond that it would be much easier to prose-
cute “clear-cut” fraud if the Supreme Court did not write decisions that had the effect of
blunting the Commission’s enforcement capabilities. In any case, one article pointed out that
the Commission would need to provide clearer standards of care if it intends to bring more
actions based on negligent conduct alone. See David M. Becker, What More Can Be Done to Deter
Violations of the Federal Securities Laws?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1882–83 (2012).
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2. Exchange Act Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)
Although Rule 10b-5(b) deals with fraudulent statements, the
Commission has been successful at prosecuting such fraud when it
can prove that the misstatement is part of a larger scheme to de-
fraud investors.132 Accordingly, the Commission might also bring
actions under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), the so-called “scheme liability”
provisions.133 Janus involved a Section 10(b) claim, but the Court
decided to focus on the language of the statute’s operative rule
rather than that of the statute itself.134 Specifically, the Court fo-
cused on subsection (b).135 Notably, neither subsection (a) nor (c)
contains the word “make.”136 So, by bringing a “scheme liability”
claim, the Commission would appear to avoid Janus’s restrictive def-
inition.137 Moreover, because Rule 10b-5 covers fraud in the
“purchase” of securities, this approach does not suffer from the pos-
sible limitations discussed above in relation to claims brought
under Section 17(a).138
Even before Janus, however, some courts had been skeptical of
what they viewed as plaintiffs’ attempts to circumvent the more
stringent requirements of Rule 10b-5(b) by simply recharacterizing
a fraudulent statement as part of a “scheme.”139 Therefore, this
strategy carries litigation risks for the Commission. There is also no
way of distinguishing interpretations of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) on
the basis of the plaintiff’s identity. Thus, the expansion of these
provisions for the purposes of Commission enforcement would si-
multaneously encourage private litigants to bring more cases.
Because Janus is focused on limiting the rights of private plaintiffs,
132. See, e.g., SEC v. Brown, 740 F. Supp. 2d 148, 171–72 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that, for
the purposes of a motion to dismiss, the defendant’s underlying conduct alleged by the Com-
mission for violations of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) was more than a reiteration of the
misrepresentations establishing the Commission’s Rule 10b-5(b) misstatement claim).
133. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (2013).
134. See discussion supra Part II.B.
135. See discussion supra Part II.B.
136. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c).
137. In fact, in SEC v. Sell, No. C 11-4941 CW, 2012 WL 3242551, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
10, 2012), the court rejected the defendant’s argument that Janus precluded an SEC action
pursuant to Rule 10b-5(a) and (c).
138. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
139. SEC v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 342, 361 (D.N.J. 2009); In re Alstom SA
Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 433, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Schnell v. Conseco, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d
438, 447–48 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (refusing to characterize allegations as market manipulation
claims where the alleged “scheme to defraud” consisted largely of an aggregation of material
misrepresentations to inflate stock, such as research reports containing misrepresentations of
the underlying facts and use of false names to solicit investors).
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it is unlikely that courts would be comfortable construing these sub-
sections in a way that would provide an end run around Janus for
private plaintiffs.
3. Section 20 of the Exchange Act of 1934
Section 20 of the Exchange Act is concerned with liability against
those that control and assist primarily violators.140 Specifically, Sec-
tion 20(a) provides for liability against any person who directly or
indirectly controls another person when the controlled person is
found liable for violating any of the federal securities laws.141 The
statute provides a defense for controlling persons who acted in
good faith and neither directly nor indirectly induced the prohib-
ited act.142 Assuming neither affirmative defense applies, the
Commission could possibly rely on this statute to bring cases in situ-
ations in which the Commission would have previously relied on
Section 10(b).
Similarly, the Commission could perhaps overcome Janus by us-
ing Section 20(b) of the Exchange Act, which makes it unlawful for
a person to directly or indirectly violate the federal securities laws
“through or by means of any other person.”143 In fact, the Janus
Court alluded in a footnote to the possibility that Section 20(b)
could have been used in that case.144 As the Janus dissent pointed
out, however, the contours of this section have not been fully ex-
plored because, in the past, Rule 10b-5 has effectively made Section
20(b) unnecessary.145 For the same reasons, the Commission has
not previously relied heavily on Section 20(a). Indeed, it was not
until 2010 that Congress, in its Dodd-Frank legislation, clarified that
the Commission could even bring an action under Section 20(a).146
Before then, there was a circuit split as to whether the Commission
qualified as a “person” for purposes of bringing actions under Sec-
tion 20(a).147
140. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2012).
141. Id. § 20(a), 78t(a).
142. Id.
143. Id. § 20(b), 78t(b).
144. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 n.10 (2011).
145. Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“‘There is a dearth of authority construing Sec-
tion 20(b),’ which has been thought largely ‘superfluous in 10b-5 cases.’” (quoting 5B
ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 11:8 (2011))).
146. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 929P(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1865 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006)).
147. Compare SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1318 (6th Cir. 1974) (explaining that the SEC
is not a “person”) with SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1472 (2d Cir. 1996)
(explaining that the SEC is a “person” for purposes of controlling person liability).
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More problematic is the fact that Sections 20(a) and 20(b) apply
to both the Commission and private litigants. So, as is the case
when the Commission brings actions under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c),
courts have no way of distinguishing their interpretations on the
basis of the plaintiff’s identity. Accordingly, the expansion of these
provisions for the purposes of the Commission’s enforcement
would simultaneously expand the ability of private litigants to main-
tain a cause of action. Such an expansion would empower the
Commission, but, as with actions under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c), it is
unlikely that courts would be comfortable construing these claims
under Section 20 in a way that would also provide an end run
around Janus for private plaintiffs.
Section 20 also contains subsection (e), which allows the Com-
mission to prosecute those who “substantially assist” others in
violating federal securities laws.148 This provision, which Congress
passed shortly after Central Bank eliminated aiding and abetting lia-
bility,149 allows the Commission to cast a wider net than is available
to private plaintiffs. By bringing actions against secondary actors,
the Commission can go after those who may lack “ultimate author-
ity” over a statement. Because secondary liability derives from
primary liability, however, the Commission is still limited by the
possibility that no person will be responsible for “making” the mis-
statement in the Janus sense. Thus, even though Section 20(e)
provides the Commission with an additional prosecutorial weapon,
it does not completely replenish the Commission’s pre-Janus
arsenal.
IV. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE COMMISSION’S JANUS PROBLEM
A. A “New” Rule 10b-5
The Commission’s reliance on other statutory provisions may not
sufficiently restore its pre-Janus enforcement capabilities. Accord-
ingly, the Commission could overcome Janus by using its
rulemaking authority to simply write a “New Rule 10b-5.” Such a
new rule could, in addition to being more expansive, govern only
public enforcement, while the “Old Rule 10b-5” would continue to
limit the parameters of the implied private right of action. Rule
10b-5 was written pursuant to this rulemaking authority.150 Unlike
148. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012).
149. See supra Part I.B and accompanying text.
150. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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previous decisions limiting actions under Rule 10b-5, Janus empha-
sized a single word contained in the Rule, rather than focusing on
the statutory language found in Section 10(b).151 Because Janus
does not limit the scope of the statute, it does not prevent the Com-
mission from issuing a new rule. Courts certainly may look askance
at a rule that so easily sidesteps the decision in Janus, or they may be
untroubled by a change in public enforcement under Rule 10b-5,
given that, at its core, Janus is a decision about limiting the private
right of action implied under Section 10(b).152
In order to restore the Commission’s enforcement powers, it
could write a rule with language nearly identical to Rule 10b-5, but
with two important changes. First, the Commission could change
the word “make” to another verb or phrase, like “create,” “by means
of,” or “substantially participates in the creation of.” Such a change
would allow courts to avoid the interpretive somersaults necessary
to explain how Janus was really a decision about limiting private
actions. Second, the Commission could include language that
plainly states that the new rule applies only to public enforcement.
Because the Court has never questioned the Commission’s power
under Section 10(b) to bring actions for fraudulent statements,153
the new rule would not raise concerns about the Commission writ-
ing a rule that exceeds the limits imposed by statute.154
More importantly, this new rule would address the Court’s con-
cerns about fueling private litigation. As explained in Part I, the
Court has begrudgingly conceded the existence of an implied pri-
vate right of action. But, the Court has vociferously opposed its
expansion since Blue Chip, stating that such an implied action must
be narrowly construed.155 As the Janus decision demonstrates, the
Court has not always adequately distinguished its holdings on the
basis of the plaintiff’s identity. Although a private action under
Rule 10b-5 may require a narrower approach, this is problematic
when the narrower approach is applied to a word that also applies
to public actions.
Having two separate rules would enable the Court to overtly ad-
just its interpretive approach to Rule 10b-5 depending on whether
151. See discussion supra Part II.B.
152. See discussion supra Part III.B.
153. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act appears to specifically provide for such
actions. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
154. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157
(2007) (noting that the scope of Section 10(b) is determined by the text of the statute and
the power to extend this scope belongs to Congress).
155. See supra Part I.A.
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the government or a private plaintiff is bringing suit. Such an ap-
proach would allow the Court to continue its practice of narrowly
interpreting the statute’s language in cases involving private plain-
tiffs, thereby dealing with the problem and costs of strike suits. At
the same time, when deciding cases brought by the Commission,
the Court could invoke the pre-Blue Chip approach and interpret
the statute flexibly with its remedial purpose in mind,156 strengthen-
ing the Commission’s enforcement efforts. By explicitly
acknowledging this difference, the Court could straightforwardly
limit private litigation while freeing public enforcement actions
from Janus’s inadvertent constraints.
B. The Beneficial Policy Consequences of a Bifurcated Approach to
Rule 10b-5
In addition to maintaining the Commission’s broad enforcement
powers, having both a “private” and “public” Rule 10b-5 could gen-
erate a beneficial policy outcome: a bifurcated approach to
misstatement liability could result in a more properly calibrated de-
terrent mechanism. Deterrence is a necessary element of any
enforcement regime, but the private attorney general has not nec-
essarily been an effective anti-fraud mechanism.157 Instead, the
current system may actually overdeter, causing companies to incur
costs that are ultimately borne by investors.158 This is a perverse re-
sult, considering that investor protection is regarded as one of the
primary purposes of the securities laws.159 While the Commission
has argued that private litigation is a “necessary supplement” to
public enforcement,160 it is not clear that this is true as an empirical
156. See discussion supra Part I.C.
157. For an early article discussing this issue, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private
Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215
(1983). More recent articles have focused on the costs of private securities litigation and the
problem of overdeterrence. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform:
Restructuring the Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 1301 (2008).
158. Rose, supra note 157, at 1331–37.
159. See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last visited November 29, 2013) (“The mission of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets,
and facilitate capital formation.”).
160. See Remarks of Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, http://www.sec.gov/news/testi-
mony/testarchive/1995/spch025.txt (“[P]rivate actions also provide a ‘necessary
supplement’ to the Commission’s own enforcement activities by serving to deter securities
law violations.”).
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matter.161 In any case, this view is predicated on the general consen-
sus that the Commission lacks the necessary resources to prosecute
securities fraud alone.162 Without fomenting private litigation, a bi-
furcated approach to Section 10(b) liability would allow courts to
empower the Commission, giving it the legal resources to prosecute
perpetrators of fraud more effectively.
A proposal to shift the balance of private and public enforce-
ment is clearly not new. When Congress passed the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 (PSLRA),163 it attempted
to reduce private securities litigation while increasing the Commis-
sion’s enforcement capabilities. For instance, the PSLRA contained
the lead plaintiff provision that was meant to quell “lawyer-driven”
litigation by reducing the costs of monitoring “entrepreneurial” at-
torneys.164 It also contained a statutory safe harbor for forward-
looking statements and imposed heightened pleading standards for
complaints alleging violations of the securities laws.165 But the
PSLRA also explicitly granted the Commission the power to bring
actions against aiders and abettors because of the concern that Cen-
tral Bank may have restricted the Commission’s ability to bring
actions against these secondary defendants.166
Furthermore, legal scholars have proposed reforms that similarly
address the perceived costs of private securities litigation by making
it more difficult to bring suits. For example, Professor Joseph A.
Grundfest suggested that the Commission “disimply” the private
right of action from Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.167 Professor
Grundfest explained that, while the implied private of action may
be “well established,” it “is not immutable.”168 Accordingly, through
its rulemaking authority, the Commission could “disimply” private
161. See Rose, supra note 157, at 1347–49 (“Borak’s mantra that private enforcement is a
‘necessary supplement’ to Commission action merely states a conclusion, and the foregoing
analysis demonstrates that it is hardly a self-evident one.”).
162. See, e.g., Luis A. Aguilar, Statement by Commissioner: Defrauded Investors Deserve Their Day
in Court, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (April 11, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/News/
PublicStmt/Detail/PublicStmt/1365171490204#_ednref20 (“It is unrealistic to expect that
the Commission will have the resources to police all securities frauds on its own, and as a
result, it is essential that investors be given private rights of action to complement and com-
plete the Commission’s efforts.”).
163. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
164. See id. § 101 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4).
165. See id. § 102 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 77u-5).
166. See id. § 104 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 78t).
167. See John A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission’s Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1994).
168. Id. at 965.
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rights of actions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without re-
stricting “[its] own ability to pursue claims of fraud.”169 According
to Professor Grundfest, through “disimplication” the Commission
would not have to worry about fomenting abusive private litigation
and could actually “create new disclosure obligations,” which could
further protect investor rights.170 In a more recent article address-
ing shortcomings of private securities litigation, Professor Amanda
M. Rose proposed an “oversight approach” which would grant the
Commission “the ability to screen which Rule 10b-5 class actions
may be filed, and against whom.”171 According to Professor Rose,
because of profit-driven private enforcement, the current regime
“leads to excessive enforcement and . . . overdeterrence”172 that can
hamper the system’s ability to achieve optimality.173 Professor
Rose’s proposal assumes that, because the Commission is not moti-
vated by profit, it may be better suited to determine which suits
have merit. Both Professor Grundfest and Professor Rose’s propos-
als attempt to solve what they identify as a problem of too much
private litigation by shifting the balance toward public
enforcement.
Like these proposals, a bifurcated approach to Rule 10b-5 could
potentially achieve a more optimal ratio of private litigation to pub-
lic enforcement. This could produce a more properly calibrated
deterrence mechanism by reducing the incidence of underdeter-
rence (by increasing public enforcement) while decisions like Janus
continue to reduce the incidence of overdeterrence (by narrowing
the implied private right of action).  More importantly, a bifurcated
approach to Rule 10b-5 may actually be more feasible than those
that overtly abate or potentially eliminate private suits.
The Commission was created and granted broad rulemaking au-
thority with the idea that it could use its expertise to more
effectively respond to problems in the securities markets.174 By pass-
ing a new Rule 10b-5, the Commission would simply be exercising
this broad rulemaking authority. It would also be creating a new
169. Id. at 966.
170. Id.
171. Rose, supra note 157, at 1301.
172. Id. at 1327.
173. See id. at 1326–27.
174. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REV. 385, 454 n.320 (1990) (quoting S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 5–6 (1934)) (“From the
outset, the committee has proceeded on the theory that so delicate a mechanism as the
modern stock exchange cannot be regulated efficiently under a rigid statutory program. Un-
less considerable latitude is allowed for the exercise of administrative discretion, it is
impossible to avoid, on the one hand, unworkable ‘strait-jacket’ regulation and, on the other,
loopholes . . . .”).
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rule to help restore its own enforcement capabilities. The public
would arguably be less likely to perceive such a move as an overt
threat to the securities class action system than would be the case if
the Commission decided to “disimply” the private right of action or
announce that it would begin screening securities class actions. Fur-
thermore, public support for a new rule that increases the
Commission’s ability to prosecute fraud would likely be easy to gar-
ner, given the blame the Commission has received for not doing
enough to prevent fraud in light of recent financial scandals.175
CONCLUSION
Based on the Supreme Court’s gradual narrowing of the implied
private right of action in securities fraud cases, it was no surprise
that in Janus—a private party suit—the Court opted for an interpre-
tation that narrowed the pool of potential defendants in actions
brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Unlike prior deci-
sions, however, the Court based its decision on an interpretation of
a single word that restricts the Commission in the same way that it
does private plaintiffs. Although the Commission may be able to
bypass Janus by bringing actions under statutes or rules other than
Rule 10b-5, those rules and statutes are not coextensive with Rule
10b-5 and raise additional complications.
Thus, the Commission’s best option for adequately restoring its
pre-Janus arsenal may be to exercise its rulemaking authority to is-
sue a new Rule 10b-5. The rule would make two important changes
to the original Rule 10b-5. First, it should change the word “make”
to a more expansive word or phrase that captures those individuals
that substantially participate in the creation of a material mislead-
ing statement, even if they lack “ultimate authority.” Second, the
new rule should only apply to public enforcement actions. Such a
rule would be consistent with Janus because it would avoid the
“make” issue and would not expand the implied private right of
action.
Going forward, this new rule would allow courts to adjust their
approach based on the plaintiff’s public or private identity, leading
to clearer decisions and permitting courts to narrowly construe the
implied private right of action without restricting the Commission’s
ability to prosecute fraud. This would address the problems of both
175. See, e.g., Patrick Jennings, SEC Blamed for Failing to Spot Madoff Fraud, FINANCIAL TIMES
(July 3, 2009, 3:01 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ee1591a2-6726-11de-925f-00144feabd
c0.html#axzz2rrECsALk.
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underdeterrence and overdeterrence. In this way, the Commission
would be fulfilling its Section 10(b) mandate to “prescribe as neces-
sary or appropriate” rules and regulations that are “in the public
interest.”176
176. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
